* fix: safety guard incorrectly blocks commands with URLs
The absolutePathPattern regex was matching URL path components like
//github.com as file system paths, causing commands containing URLs
to be incorrectly blocked by the workspace restriction safety guard.
For example, 'agent-browser open https://github.com' would be blocked
because //github.com was treated as an absolute file path outside
the working directory.
The fix adds a check to skip any path match that starts with '//',
as these are URL path components, not file system paths.
Fixes#1203
* fix: handle file:// URIs correctly in safety guard
The previous fix skipped all paths starting with '//', which incorrectly
also skipped file:// URIs that could escape the workspace sandbox.
Changes:
- Only skip '//' paths when preceded by web URL schemes (http:, https:, ftp:, etc.)
- file:// URIs are now properly checked against workspace boundaries
- Added TestShellTool_FileURISandboxing to verify the fix
Fixes security issue raised by @alexhoshina in PR #1254
* style: fix gofumpt formatting
* fix(safety-guard): use exact match position to prevent URL exemption bypass
Using strings.Index(cmd, raw) always returned the first occurrence of the
matched substring, allowing a bypass where the same //path appeared both
inside a URL and as a standalone shell path (e.g. echo https://etc/passwd
&& cat //etc/passwd would skip the second match).
Switch to FindAllStringIndex so each match is evaluated at its actual
position in the command string.
Adds TestShellTool_URLBypassPrevented to cover the exploit scenario.
6b72326be1